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Technology Transfer into China: Preparing for a New Era1 
ARNOUD DE MEYER, INSEAD Campus, Singapore 
Currently, there are three forces creating a more favourable background for western multinational companies to do new 
business in China by transferring new technology. First, growing overcapacity means China requires not traditional turnkey 
factories, but instead, technology which leads to innovation and improvement. Second, a changing attitude by all levels of 
Chinese government to demanding state-of-the-art technology including software instead of previous generation technology, 
and to technology management and commercial implementation more. Third, intellectual property rights are becoming better 
respected. 
The author makes suggestions to best manage technology transfer into China, with this changed background. Based on six 
case studies and extensive desk and literature research, he makes proposals under three headings: creating a win-win situation, 
applying good basic principles of technology transfer to the Chinese case, and applying common sense to the management of 
intellectual property rights. 
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Introduction 
Transferring technology into China is barely a new challenge. From the beginning of the opening of China at the end of the 
seventies, companies like Alcatel Bell, Volkswagen, Nortel, BP, Shell and others have been confronted with how to develop 
a clever policy of transfer in order to combine meeting the real needs of the local production as well as satisfying a Chinese 
central or local Government with the building up of local capabilities, and with the protection of the proprietary know-how 
for the multinational organization. Moreover, this challenge appears to be not so different from any transfer of know-how to 
any large developing country. So why do I raise this issue once again? 
My interest was raised through a number of discussions with managers of western multinationals operating in China, as well 
as some observations made by China-watchers who pointed out there are three forces are creating a new situation. 
First, there is a new context for doing business in China in the aftermath of the Asian monetary crisis. A new economic 
situation has been created. Before the crisis the Asian economies were confronted with a chronic undercapacity, and success 
in business was often the mere consequence of adding production resources in order to respond to almost unlimited demand. 
The crisis has made us realise that this period has been coming to an end, at least for Asia, and that growing overcapacity in 
many industries was the basis of lack of sufficient returns on investments. I am not arguing that this period of satisfying a 
demand which is larger than the supply capacity is completely over for China. But in several sectors (think only of the 
oversupply in real estate in Shanghai or Beijing), and in particular for sectors that live on export, this overcapacity is a real 
problem. The growing internationalisation, the devaluations in the currencies of South-East Asian Countries and the 
emergence of new competitors in Latin America or Central Asia is not going to improve this situation for China. We all know 
that competition in a world with overcapacity will require innovation and productivity improvements. That implies that China 
will need a different kind of technology, not the traditional turnkey production capacity in the form of a factory, or a 
production system, but the technology that will enable local teams to manage a process of innovation and improvement. 
Second, we observe a change in the attitude of the Chinese Government (be it central, provincial or local). The new demands 
can be described as four types of changes: 
 A thrust from manufacturing to the capability to carry out development: putting things together is not sufficient 
anymore; the Chinese authorities want to capitalise on the existing research capabilities but need a better 
understanding of how to translate concepts into commercial products, systems or services. 
 From an exclusive emphasis on hardware to an emphasis on hardware and software: until fairly recently to Chinese 
authorities, technology was often synonymous with hardware; software was often seen as a sort of free goody that 
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came on top of the hardware. Very recently, there seems to be a growing awareness that software can have value on 
its own. 
 From previous generation technology to state of the art: we in the West are often arguing that China does not need 
the latest fashion in technology, and we have arguments about ‘appropriate’ technology. But the Chinese partners 
are convinced (and perhaps not without reason) that international competition requires in many cases the capabilities 
offered by state of the art technology. 
 There seem also to be some early indicators that Chinese receivers of technology are starting to understand that 
technology management is as much about the current specifications and capabilities as about the constant upgrading 
of those capabilities: know-how about maintenance and technology upgrading should be considered as important as 
the know-how about the current state of the art. 
Third, there is a gradual evolution in the policies concerning intellectual property rights (IPR). In my recent discussions, I 
came to the conclusion that companies observe a real change since 1996. Not that there aren’t problems any more. 
Counterfeit and copies are still abundant. But several business people have developed a more balanced view on China’s 
attitude towards Intellectual Property Rights. According to them, the situation in China is not worse than in other developing 
countries, and leaks, which are blamed on the Chinese operations, have often occurred elsewhere. Moreover some companies 
have been somewhat naïve: we all know that you should not put the cat next to the milk, if you don’t want her to drink. In the 
same way you should not expose technologies that you want to keep secret. On the other hand the Government is taking a 
more public stance on the protection of IPR —and let’s be fair, even in developed countries the protection of IPR is not 
always that exemplary. 
 
What to Do? 
Given this somewhat changed situation, what can we say about the management of technology transfer? In order to get a 
better understanding of this I looked at six cases2 and combined it with an extensive desk research of recent comments and 
descriptions in both the popular and academic press. I want to group my comments under three headings: (1) create a win/win 
situation, (2) apply good basic principles of technology transfer to the Chinese case and (3) put some common sense in the 
management of the IPR. 
Creating a Win/Win Situation 
One of the strongest messages that emerged from discussions and desk research is that the term technology transfer is an 
expression of the wrong approach. Several people talked about technology exchange, to indicate that the transfer has to be 
balanced with learning from the Chinese partner. There appeared to be a search for a sort of equilibrium in the transfer 
activity. This was best expressed by two recurring questions: (1) do you know what you want out of the Chinese partner and 
(2) do you have a clear idea about what your strategy for China entails? 
One of the experienced managers that we interviewed expressed the first issue as follows: ‘You know you are going to share 
technological information, you know you are going to reveal more than you originally intended, you may as well want to 
think about what you want to get out of the Chinese at the end of the road in five years from now, and … organise yourself 
for it!’ Prodded on what you can learn from the Chinese partner, it turned out that most of the time our interviewees referred 
to management of Chinese human resources. Very soon the pool of available labour in the world will be about 20 per cent of 
Chinese origin. One may as well start to learn how to manage it. 
The second question was really a call for more clarity about the strategic views for the Chinese market. Since all of my 
observations came from the manufacturing industry, I have been able to narrow this question. The quest for clarity in strategy 
was translated into three subquestions: 
1. Do you have a clear view why you invest in China: Are you in search of a market? Do you see it as a base for export into 
the world market? Or do you hope to find technology in China that can enhance your home base capabilities? Depending on 
the answer to this question you will have to develop a totally different policy of technology transfer. In the first case you can 
probably limit yourself to the transfer of appropriate (and not necessarily the most sophisticated) technology. In the second 
case you need to develop world class manufacturing capabilities: you are not going to export into a highly competitive 
environment unless you have the quality and efficiency levels that are deployed by your competitors. In the third case you 
will need to observe the golden rule of informal technology trade: you will only get something, and in particular the tacit 
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know-how, if you are willing to give something. In the particular case of China that probably means that you will have to 
invest extensively in the development skills of excellent, but perhaps overtheoretical researchers.  
2. Do you have the ambition to contribute to the restructuring of the Chinese market? We all know that many sectors in China 
are too fragmented. By some counts there are more than 110 producers of vehicles in China, a market that takes currently less 
than 1,600,000 vehicles per year (this is less than the total sales of a large producer such as Ford in Europe alone). The same 
fragmentation exists in many other industries. The local protectionism can maintain this situation for a while. But if one is 
convinced that the pending entry of China into the WTO will force a change in this situation, one had better start forcing the 
restructuring now. This will require strong efficiency objectives, as well as the technological resources that are needed to 
enable such a restructuring. 
3. What is your interest in creating a strong supplier base? The current situation is such, that in many sectors suppliers and 
subcontractors have insufficient scale to both work for a limited number of large customers, and to develop at the same time 
world class capabilities. That means that large western multinationals, which are fierce competitors outside (and perhaps 
inside) China, will have to invest in common suppliers, and thus improve the performance of the suppliers to their 
competitors. It is a tough call: are you prepared to transfer technology to some of your local suppliers in order to upgrade 
them, knowing at the same time that know-how may well leak to your competitor? 
 
Apply the Basic and General Principles of Technology Transfer to Your Operations in China 
China may be an ‘exotic’ market, but there is no such thing as a ‘Chinese’ way of technology transfer. There are only good 
and bad ways of managing that process. Combining my own twenty years of experience with issues in technology transfer 
and the observations made by experienced managers in China, I would like to recall a few good basic principles that also 
seem to work in China. Although perhaps a bit simplistic, one can argue that the success of technology transfer depends on 
four factors3: (1) the absorptive capacity of the receiver (this is an application of the old adage that says to teach only the 
‘teachables’); (2) the investment made by the sender in the process of transfer; (3) the credibility of the sender; and (4) the 
investment in the intangibles of technology: apart from the tangible know-how described in specs and drawings we need also 
to invest in the transfer of the tacit know-how, the enthusiasm for the technology and the authority to adapt and transform the 
technology. Let us examine the first two and most important of these factors in the context of China. 
With respect to the improvement of the absorptive capacity of the receiver, the interviewed executives mentioned two issues: 
(a) There is lack of practical understanding of the Chinese workers and engineers, and an inability to go beyond ‘linear 
thinking’. This can be illustrated by two comments: ‘how can you expect Chinese workers to understand what a car is, if less 
than one out of a hundred have a driver’s licence’ and ‘Chinese engineers are well trained and have sometimes brilliant minds, 
but they have difficulty with conceptual thinking, cannot treat problems in parallel, worry too much about today and cannot 
think about tomorrow’. Like all comments taken out of their context they are probably extreme, but they illustrate the point 
that sheer quality of minds is not sufficient to absorb technology which has been developed in a different economic context 
and culture. 
(b) Many Chinese partners feel an urge to jump ahead, to short circuit a few steps in the natural development of knowledge. 
Again a quote may illustrate this: ‘Development of world class capabilities requires you to go in a number of steps. In our 
organization we have developed “n” steps. Our Chinese partners want to jump immediately from step 1 to step n. You can 
perhaps go faster in the development than it took us, but you cannot jump the logical sequence of these steps’. Several other 
people from the applied electronics sector mentioned that the step from a hardware producer to a systems supplier, who 
combines hardware with software into a solution, was a very tall order for most Chinese suppliers. 
The obvious answer to these challenges is education and training. But as you will understand from the examples, this training 
is much more about context, and about the grooming of partners into a different way of thinking and experience, than about 
straightforward training in the technology. 
The second recurring theme was about the investment made by the (western) sender. In the case of China there was less 
concern about the investment in physical assets, than about the investment in strategic vision and people. Time and again we 
heard the same comments: these people are good, they master the technical tools, they understand the technology, but what is 
lacking is a vision of what to do tomorrow, of what the interesting problems are to work on. Give them the questions and they 
will solve them, but defining the interesting and challenging questions is often beyond the current capabilities of the Chinese 
partners. 
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It did not require a lot of effort to make the interviewees come up with what they saw as the most important investment to be 
made: it is the one in people, in particular in high potential. The two main objectives of this investment seem to be the 
development of practical skills for applied product and process development, and the increase of the retention rate. In the 
whole process of technology transfer people are key and retention of key people is the real challenge. Companies obviously 
implement a variety of measures, but some that are worth mentioning are: 
 Home base training of selected individuals for periods not extending beyond three months 
 Training as a group, in order to create a team feeling and a peer pressure to stay with the group in the company (as 
opposed to jumping after the training to a competing company) 
 Investing in development skills under the guidance of foreign tutors, with whom developments carried out abroad 
are repeated (with some adaptation to the local market) 
Finally many comments made in the interviews pointed at the need to invest in the context. Some examples may illustrate 
what is meant by this: 
 ‘The productivity pressure isn’t there yet. And it is sad to say, but it is even less so for MNO’s than for local private 
companies’ 
 ‘In China there simply isn’t the same culture in terms of environmental awareness or attention paid to safety 
procedures’ 
 ‘We have invested in creating pride in our products and processes’. 
It may sound like stating the obvious, but these comments reflect the dangers that can arise when the sender in Europe, 
United States or Japan, neglects the differences in infrastructure, history, traditions, etc. This may be even more true when the 
sender is convinced that his or her culture is quite close to the Chinese one. The recent semi-debacle of the Singapore 
investment in the industrial park of Suzhou is a quite interesting example for analysis. This example is a complex one, and 
will hopefully become an interesting case study in the future, but it appears that one of the false assumptions that was made, 
was that once you have an agreement with the Central government, you are in good shape. For Singaporean companies that 
are used to working with an efficient central government that appears to be obvious. For the mayor of Suzhou, this was 
clearly the wrong assumption. He went ahead with the creation of his own industry park, at lower operating cost, much to the 
dismay of the Singaporean investors. 
 
Put Some Common Sense in the Management of IPR 
When it comes to protection of IPR there is some good and bad news. The good news is that there is a gradual recognition by 
the Chinese Government that IPR will actually be to the advantage of the Chinese business in the long run. As a consequence 
government officials begin to speak up in favour of IPR and will condemn counterfeit and copying. Some companies that 
have actively pursued the protection of their rights have seen some encouraging signs. Raids were 
carried out, and the experience is that good relations with the enforcing agencies, as well as paying for the raids, actually has 
led to a repeated action against counterfeited products. Using outside intelligence agencies (in places such as Hong Kong) has 
also helped to provide the information necessary for the enforcement agencies to take action. Moreover it is the current 
experience that the burden of evidence in order to get some action going or to obtain condemnation of copiers has generally 
been lighter than what is needed in for example the United States. The experience also shows that protection of trademarks is 
easier than protection of patents. The bad news is that the Chinese Government and society has not yet digested the idea that 
software should be protected. Some figures suggest that 97 per cent of the software used in China is copied. And as the 
People’s Daily wrote on January 13, 1999: — ‘problems with the court system include unqualified judges, local 
protectionism, interference by local officials, and acceptance of bribes by judges’. Enforcement is obviously going to be 
hindered by such a situation.  
Given this mixed situation I would like to suggest taking a common sense approach, which I summarise in four points: 
 Do not overdramatise the situation: it is not worse in China than in other developing economies. As always, keep in 
mind that a cat next to the milk will drink. Keep secret what you consider to be vital to your interests! 
 Speed of planned obsolescence of your products may be essential: speed in development of new products is often 
the best defense in the fight for markets. 
 Create the necessary firewalls upfront: do not leave it until you have transferred technology intoChina how to 
protect it. Think about the necessary protection systems before you start. 
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 Educate the Chinese side about the advantages of the protection of IPR: this is obviously not something that will 
have results in the short term. But self-interest is still perhaps the best teacher and very soon China will have its own 
technological exports which will be subject to copying from companies in India, Indonesia, Thailand, etc. 
 
A Short Afterthought 
In a recent comment in the EIU report on Asia (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999), there was an analysis of the mobile 
phone market in China. The starting point of this analysis was that few other sectors have been performing so successfully for 
foreigners. The EIU put a list of reasons together to explain this performance. It may be interesting to just have a look at 
those, because they may also show the ideal business conditions for successful technology transfer: 
 Meeting a real need, especially for consumers 
 Not threatening the survival of existing local players 
 Enhancing the revenues of existing local players 
 Transferring to a sector supported and encouraged by the State 
 Ensuring enough competition between players to ward off domestic concerns of one foreign business securing a 
monopoly position 
 Introducing a technology coveted by the Chinese authorities 
 Opening up a sector where domestic business can follow (but not too rapidly from the point of view of the foreign 
operator) 
Perhaps this is a good list of criteria that one should add to the comments above about how to make technology transfer 
successful, in order to manage the whole process of introducing and developing technology in China. 
 
Notes 
1.  This text is based on a presentation made to the INSEAD Euro Asia Annual Forum held on November 12, 1999 in Hong 
Kong. 
2.  The cases concerned four examples from the applied electronics industry, one automobile company and one chemical 
company. 
3.  This set is partially based on Szulanski (1996). 
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